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ABSTRACT
Model checking of strategic ability under imperfect infor-
mation is known to be hard. The complexity results range
from NP-completeness to undecidability, depending on the
precise setup of the problem. No less importantly, fixpoint
equivalences do not generally hold for imperfect information
strategies, which seriously hampers incremental synthesis of
winning strategies.
In this paper, we propose translations of ATLir formulae
that provide lower and upper bounds for their truth values,
and are cheaper to verify than the original specifications.
That is, if the expression is verified as true then the cor-
responding formula of ATLir should also hold in the given
model. We begin by showing where the straightforward ap-
proach does not work. Then, we propose how it can be
modified to obtain guaranteed lower bounds. To this end,
we alter the next-step operator in such a way that traversing
one’s indistinguishability relation is seen as atomic activity.
Most interestingly, the lower approximation is provided by
a fixpoint expression that uses a nonstandard variant of the
next-step ability operator. We show the correctness of the
translations, establish their computational complexity, and
validate the approach by experiments with a scalable sce-
nario of Bridge play.
The paper will appear in: S. Das, E. Durfee, K.
Larson, M. Winikoff (eds.), Proceedings of the 16th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2017), May 8–12, 2017,
Sao Paulo, Brazil .
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing number of works that study the syn-
tactic and semantic variants of the strategic logic ATL for
agents with imperfect information [2]. The contributions are
mainly theoretical, and include results concerning the con-
ceptual soundness of a given semantics [29, 18, 1, 21, 10,
15, 2], meta-logical properties [16, 7], and the complexity of
model checking [29, 20, 16, 30, 13, 5]. However, there is rel-
atively little research on the use of the logics, in particular
on practical algorithms for reasoning and/or verification in
scenarios where agents have a limited view of the world.
This is somewhat easy to understand, since model check-
ing of ATL variants with imperfect information has been
proved ∆P2 - to PSPACE-complete for agents playing mem-
oryless strategies [29, 20, 5] and EXPTIME-complete to
undecidable for agents with perfect recall of the past [13,
16]. Moreover, the imperfect information semantics of ATL
does not admit alternation-free fixpoint characterizations [6,
11, 12], which makes incremental synthesis of strategies im-
possible, or at least difficult to achieve. Some early attempts
at verification of imperfect information strategies made their
way into the MCMAS model-checker [25, 28, 23, 24], but the
issue was never at the heart of the tool. More dedicated at-
tempts began to emerge only recently [26, 8, 17, 9]. Up
until now, experimental results confirm that the initial in-
tuition was right: model checking of strategic modalities for
imperfect information is hard, and dealing with it requires
innovative algorithms and verification techniques.
In this paper, we propose that in some instances, instead
of the exact model checking, it suffices to provide an upper
and/or lower bound for the output. The intuition for the
upper bound is straightforward: instead of checking exis-
tence of an imperfect information strategy, we can look for
a perfect information strategy that obtains the same goal.
If the latter is false, the former must be false too. Finding a
reasonable lower bound is nontrivial, but we construct one
by means of a fixpoint expression in alternating epistemic
mu-calculus. We begin by showing that the straightforward
fixpoint approach does not work. Then, we propose how
it can be modified to obtain guaranteed lower bounds. To
this end, we alter the next-step operator in such a way that
traversing the appropriate epistemic neighborhood is seen as
an atomic activity. We show the correctness of the transla-
tions, establish their computational complexity, and validate
the approach by experiments with some scalable scenarios.
2. VERIFYING STRATEGIC ABILITY
In this section we provide an overview of the relevant vari-
ants of ATL. We refer the to [3, 31, 29, 6, 19] for details.
2.1 Models, Strategies, Outcomes
A concurrent epistemic game structure or CEGS is given
by M = 〈Agt, St,Props, V, Act, d, o, {∼a| a ∈ Agt}〉 which
includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Agt = {1, . . . , k},
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a nonempty set of states St, a set of atomic propositions
Props and their valuation V : Props → 2St, and a nonempty
finite set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St →
2Act defines nonempty sets of actions available to agents at
each state, and o is a (deterministic) transition function that
assigns the outcome state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and
a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 that can be executed by Agt
in q. We write da(q) instead of d(a, q). Every ∼a⊆ St×St is
an epistemic equivalence relation. The CEGS is assumed to
be uniform, in the sense that q ∼a q′ implies da(q) = da(q′).
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Figure 1: A simple model of voting and coercion
Example 1. Consider a very simple voting scenario with
two agents: the voter v and the coercer c. The voter casts
a vote for a selected candidate i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (action votei).
Upon exit from the polling station, the voter can hand in a
proof of how she voted to the coercer (action give) or refuse
to hand in the proof (action ng). The proof may be a certified
receipt from the election authorities, a picture of the ballot
taken with a smartphone, etc. After that, the coercer can
either punish the voter (pun) or not punish (np).
The CEGS Mvote modeling the scenario for n = 2 is
shown in Figure 1. Proposition votei labels states where the
voter has already voted for candidate i. Proposition pun indi-
cates states where v has been punished. The indistinguisha-
bility relation for the coercer is depicted by dotted lines.
A strategy of agent a ∈ Agt is a conditional plan that
specifies what a is going to do in every possible situation.
Formally, a perfect information memoryless strategy for a
can be represented by a function sa : St → Act satisfy-
ing sa(q) ∈ da(q) for each q ∈ St. An imperfect informa-
tion memoryless strategy additionally satisfies that sa(q) =
sa(q
′) whenever q ∼a q′. Following [29], we refer to the
former as Ir-strategies, and to the latter as ir-strategies.
A collective x-strategy sA, for A ⊆ Agt and x ∈ {Ir, ir},
is a tuple of individual x-strategies, one per agent from A.
The set of all such strategies is denoted by ΣxA. By sA|a we
denote the strategy of agent a ∈ A selected from sA.
Given two partial functions f, f ′ : X ⇀ Y , we say that f ′
extends f (denoted f ⊆ f ′) if, whenever f(x) is defined, we
have f(x) = f ′(x). A partial function s′a : St ⇀ Act is called
a partial x-strategy for a if s′a is extended by some strategy
sa ∈ Σxa. A collective partial x-strategy sA is a tuple of
partial x-strategies, one per agent from A.
A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . is an infinite sequence of states
such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1. We
use λ[i] to denote the ith position on path λ (starting from
i = 0). Function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths that
can result from the execution of strategy sA from state q.
We will sometimes write outIr(q, sA) instead of out(q, sA).
Moreover, function outir(q, sA) =
⋃
a∈A
⋃
q∼aq′ out(q
′, sA)
collects all the outcome paths that start from states that
are indistinguishable from q to at least one agent in A.
2.2 Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
We use a variant of ATL that explicitly distinguishes be-
tween perfect and imperfect information abilities. Formally,
the syntax is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉xXϕ | 〈〈A〉〉xGϕ | 〈〈A〉〉xϕUϕ,
where x ∈ {Ir, ir}, p ∈ Props and A ⊆ Agt. We read 〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ
as “A can identify and execute a strategy that enforces γ,” X
as “in the next state,” G as “now and always in the future,”
and U as “until.” 〈〈A〉〉
Ir
γ can be read as “A might be able
to bring about γ if allowed to make lucky guesses along the
way.” We focus on the kind of ability expressed by 〈〈A〉〉
ir
.
The other strategic modality (i.e., 〈〈A〉〉
Ir
) will prove useful
when approximating 〈〈A〉〉
ir
.
The semantics of ATL can be defined as follows:
• M, q |= p iff q ∈ V (p),
• M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ,
• M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |= ϕ and M, q |= ψ,
• M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉xXϕ iff there exists sA ∈ ΣxA such that
for all λ ∈ outx(q, sA) we have M,λ[1] |= ϕ,
• M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉xGϕ iff there exists sA ∈ ΣxA such that
for all λ ∈ outx(q, sA) and i ∈ N we have M,λ[i] |= ϕ,
• M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉xψUϕ iff there exists sA ∈ ΣxA such
that for all λ ∈ outx(q, sA) there is i ∈ N for which
M,λ[i] |= ϕ and M,λ[j] |= ψ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
We will often write 〈A〉ϕ instead of 〈〈A〉〉
ir
Xϕ to express one-
step abilities under imperfect information. Additionally, we
define “now or sometime in the future” as Fϕ ≡ >Uϕ.
Example 2. Consider model Mvote from Example 1. The
following formula expresses that the coercer can ensure that
the voter will eventually either have voted for candidate i
(presumably chosen by the coercer for the voter to vote for)
or be punished: 〈〈c〉〉
ir
F
(¬pun→ votei). We note that it holds
in Mvote, q0 for any i = 1, 2. A strategy for c that validates
the property is sc(q3) = np, sc(q4) = sc(q5) = sc(q6) = pun
for i = 1, and symmetrically for i = 2.
Consequently, the formula 〈〈v〉〉
ir
G
(¬pun ∧ ¬votei) saying
that the voter can avoid voting for candidate i and being
punished, is false in Mvote, q0 for all i = 1, 2.
We refer to the syntactic fragment containing only 〈〈A〉〉
ir
modalities as ATLir, and to the one containing only 〈〈A〉〉Ir
modalities as ATLIr.
Proposition 1 ([3, 29, 20]). Model checking ATLIr is
P-complete and can be done in time O(|M |·|ϕ|) where |M | is
the number of transitions in the model and |ϕ| is the length
of the formula.
Model checking ATLir is ∆
P
2 -complete wrt |M | and |ϕ|.
Remark 2. The semantics of 〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ encodes the notion
of “subjective” ability [29, 21]: the agents must have a suc-
cessful strategy from all the states that they consider possible
when the system is in state q. Then, they know that the strat-
egy indeed obtains γ. The alternative notion of “objective”
ability [7] requires a winning strategy from state q alone. We
focus on the subjective interpretation, as it is more standard
in ATL and more relevant in game solving (think of a card
game, such as poker or bridge: the challenge is to find a
strategy that wins for all possible hands of the opponents).
Note that if [q]∼E
A
= {q} and γ contains no nested strate-
gic modalities, then the subjective and objective semantics of
〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ at q coincide. Moreover, model checking 〈〈A〉〉
ir
p1 U p2
and 〈〈A〉〉
ir
Gp in M, q according to the objective semantics
can be easily reduced to the subjective case by adding a spu-
rious initial state q′, with transitions to all states in [q]∼E
A
,
controlled by a “dummy” agent outside A [27].
2.3 Reasoning about Knowledge
Having indistinguishability relations in the models, we can
interpret knowledge modalities Ka in the standard way:
• M, q |= Kaϕ iff M, q′ |= ϕ for all q such that q ∼a q′.
The semantics of“everybody knows” (EA) and common knowl-
edge (CA) is defined analogously by assuming the relation
∼EA=
⋃
a∈A ∼a to aggregate individual uncertainty in A,
and ∼CA to be the transitive closure of ∼EA. Additionally, we
take ∼E∅ to be the minimal reflexive relation. We also use
[q]R = {q′ | qRq′} to denote the image of q wrt relation R.
Example 3. The following formulae hold in Mvote, q0 for
any i = 1, 2 by virtue of strategy sc presented in Example 2:
• 〈〈c〉〉
ir
F
(
(¬Kcvotei)→ pun
)
: The coercer has a strategy
so that, eventually, the voter is punished unless the
coercer has learnt that the voter voted as instructed;
• 〈〈c〉〉
ir
G
(
(Kcvotei)→ ¬pun
)
: Moreover, the coercer can
guarantee that if he learns that the voter obeyed, then
the voter will not be punished.
2.4 Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus
It is well known that the modalities in ATLIr have simple
fixpoint characterizations [3], and hence ATLIr can be em-
bedded in a variant of µ-calculus with 〈〈A〉〉
Ir
X as the basic
modality. At the same time, the analogous variant of µ-
calculus for imperfect information has incomparable expres-
sive power to ATLir [6], which suggests that, under imper-
fect information, ATL and fixpoint specifications provide
different views of strategic ability.
Formally, alternating epistemic µ-calculus (AEµC) takes
the next-time fragment of ATLir, possibly with epistemic
modalities, and adds the least fixpoint operator µ. The
greatest fixpoint operator ν is defined as dual. Let Vars
be a set of second-order variables ranging over 2St. The
language of AEµC is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | Z | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈A〉ϕ | µZ(ϕ) | Ka,
where p ∈ Props, Z ∈ Vars, a ∈ Agt, A ⊆ Agt, and
the formulae are Z–positive, i.e., each free occurrence of
Z is in the scope of an even number of negations. We de-
fine νZ(ϕ(Z)) ≡ ¬µZ(¬ϕ(¬Z)). A formula of AEµC is
alternation-free if in its negation normal form it contains no
occurrences of ν (resp. µ) on any syntactic path from an
occurrence of µZ (resp. νZ) to a bound occurrence of Z.
The denotational semantics of af -AEµC (i.e., the alterna-
tion-free fragment of AEµC) assigns to each formula ϕ the
set of states [[ϕ]]MV where ϕ is true under the valuation V ∈
Vals:
• [[p]]MV = V (p), [[Z]]MV = V(Z),
• [[¬ϕ]]MV = St \ [[ϕ]]MV ,
• [[ϕ ∨ ψ]]MV = [[ϕ]]MV ∪ [[ψ]]MV ,
• [[〈A〉ϕ]]MV = {q ∈ St | ∃sA ∈ ΣA ∀λ ∈ out irM (q, sA)
λ[1] ∈ [[ϕ]]MV },
• [[µZ(ϕ)]]MV =
⋂{Q ⊆ St | [[ϕ]]MV[Z:=Q] ⊆ Q},
• [[Kaϕ]]MV ={q ∈ St | ∀q′(q′∼a q implies q′ ∈ [[ϕ]]MV )}.
If ϕ contains no free variables, then its validity does not
depend on V, and we write M, q |= ϕ instead of q ∈ [[ϕ]]MV .
Example 4. Consider the AEµC formula µZ.
(
(¬pun→
votei)∨〈c〉Z
)
, i.e., the “naive” fixpoint translation of the for-
mula 〈〈c〉〉
ir
F
(¬pun → votei) from Example 2. The fixpoint
computation produces the whole set of states St. Thus, in
particular, Mvote, q0 |= µZ.
(
(¬pun→ votei) ∨ 〈c〉Z
)
.
Proposition 3 ([6]). Model checking af -AEµC with
strategic modalities for up to 2 agents is P-complete and
can be done in time O(|∼| · |ϕ|) where |∼| is the size of the
largest equivalence class among ∼1, . . . ,∼k, and |ϕ| is the
length of the formula.
For coalitions of size at least 3, the problem is between
NP and ∆P2 wrt |∼| and |ϕ|.
Thus, alternation-free alternating epistemic µ-calculus can
be an attractive alternative to ATLir from the complexity
point of view. Unfortunately, formulae of ATLir admit no
universal translations to af -AEµC. Formally, it was proved
in [6, Proposition 6] that af -AEµC does not cover the ex-
pressive power of ATLir. The proof uses formulae of type
〈〈a〉〉Fp, but it is easy to construct an analogous argument
for 〈〈a〉〉Gp. In consequence, long-term strategic modalities
of ATLir do not have alternation-free fixpoint characteriza-
tions in terms of the next-step strategic modalities 〈A〉. A
similar result was proved for ATLiR in [11, Theorem 11].
3. LOWER BOUNDS FOR ABILITIES
The complexity of AEµC model checking seems more at-
tractive than that of ATLir. Unfortunately, the expressiv-
ity results cited in Section 2.4 imply that there is no simple
fixpoint translation which captures exactly the meaning of
ATLir operators. It might be possible, however, to come
up with a translation tr that provides a lower bound of the
actual strategic abilities, i.e., such that M, q |= tr(〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ)
implies M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ. In other words, a translation which
can only reduce, but never enhance the abilities of the coali-
tion.
We begin by investigating the “naive” fixpoint translation
that mimics the one for ATLIr, and show that it works
q0
p
q1
1
a a
Figure 2: CEGS M0: a counterexample for tr1
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Figure 3: M1: a counterexample for tr2
in some cases, but not in general. Then, we propose how
to alter the semantics of the nexttime modality so that a
general lower bound can be obtained. We focus first on
reachability goals, expressed by formulae 〈〈A〉〉
ir
Fϕ, and then
move on to the other modalities.
3.1 Trying It Simple for Reachability Goals
We assume from now on that ϕ is a formula of ATLir, M
is a CEGS, and q is a state in M (unless explicitly stated
otherwise). We start with the simplest translation, analo-
gous to that of [3]: tr1(〈〈A〉〉irFϕ) = µZ.(ϕ ∨ 〈A〉Z). Un-
fortunately, this translation provides neither a lower nor an
upper bound. For the former, use model M0 in Figure 2, and
observe that M0, q0 |= µZ.(p∨ 〈1〉Z) but M0, q0 6|= 〈〈1〉〉irFp.
For the latter, take model M in [6, Figure 1], and observe
that M, q0 |= 〈〈1〉〉irFp but M, q0 6|= µZ.(p ∨ 〈1〉Z).
Proposition 4. M, q |= µZ.(ϕ ∨ 〈A〉Z) does not imply
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
Fϕ. The converse implication does not hold
either.
Consider now a slightly stronger fixpoint specification:
tr2(〈〈A〉〉irFϕ) = µZ.(EAϕ ∨ 〈A〉Z). This new translation
works to an extent, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5.
1. M, q |= µZ.(E∅ϕ ∨ 〈∅〉Z) iff M, q |= 〈〈∅〉〉irFϕ;
2. If |A| = 1, then M, q |= µZ.(EAϕ ∨ 〈A〉Z) implies
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
Fϕ, but the converse does not hold;1
3. If |A| > 1, then M, q |= µZ.(EAϕ ∨ 〈A〉Z) does not
imply M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
Fϕ, and vice versa.
Proof. Case 1: follows from the fact that for the empty
coalition the ir–reachability is equivalent to the IR–reachabi-
lity, which in turn has a fixpoint characterization.
1 Note that, for A = {a}, EAϕ is equivalent to Kaϕ.
(A) (B)
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a
Figure 4: Lower bounds are not tight: (A) M2; (B) M3
Case 2: Let us assume that A = {a} for some a ∈ Agt. We
define the sequence {Fj}j∈N of af -AEµC formulae s.t. F0 =
Kaϕ and Fj+1 = F0∨〈a〉Fj , for all j ≥ 0. From Kleene fixed-
point theorem we have [[µZ.(Kaϕ ∨ 〈a〉Z)]] = ⋃∞j=0[[Fj ]], and
{[[Fj ]]}j∈N is a non-decreasing monotone sequence of subsets
of St. Now, we prove that for each j ∈ N there exists a
partial strategy sja s.t. dom(s
j
a) = [[Fj ]], ∀q ∈ dom(sja) ∀λ ∈
out ir(q, sja) ∃k ≤ j λ[k] |= ϕ, and sja ⊆ sj+1a . The proof is
by induction on j. We constructively build sj+1a from s
j
a
for each j ∈ N. The base case is trivial. For the inductive
step, firstly observe that for each j ∈ N if q ∈ [[Fj ]], then
[q]∼a ⊆ [[Fj ]]. As ∼a is an equivalence relation, for each
q ∈ [[Fj+1]] either [q]∼a ⊆ [[Fj ]] or [q]∼a ⊆ [[Fj+1]] \ [[Fj ]].
In the first case we put sj+1a (q) = s
j
a(q). In the second
case, we know that there exists a strategy sqa s.t. ∀λ ∈
out ir(q, sqa) λ[1] ∈ [[Fj ]]. We thus put sj+1a (q′) = sqa(q′) for
all q′ ∈ [q]∼a , which concludes the inductive proof.
We finally define the partial strategy sa =
⋃
j∈N s
j
a. For
each q ∈ St s.t. M, q |= µZ.(Kaϕ ∨ 〈a〉Z), either M, q |= ϕ,
or ϕ is reached along each path consistent with any extension
of sa to a full strategy.
For the converse implication, take model M in [6, Fig-
ure 1], and observe that M, q0 |= 〈〈1〉〉irFp but M, q0 6|=
µZ.(K1p ∨ 〈1〉Z).
Case 3: Consider the CEGS M1 presented in Figure 3.
We assume that d1(q) = {a, b} and d2(q) = {x, y}, for
q ∈ {q1, q2, q3, q4}. In the remaining states the protocols
allow only one action. For clarity, we omit from the figure
the transitions leaving the states q1, q2, q3, and q4, leading
to state sink . Assume now ϕ ≡ p. Note that M, q0 |=
µZ.(E{1,2}ϕ∨〈{1, 2}〉Z) and M, q0 6|= 〈〈1, 2〉〉irFϕ. For larger
coalitions A, we extend the model with a sufficient number
of spurious (idle) agents.
For the other direction, use the counterexample from Case 2,
extended with appropriately many spurious agents.
As Propositions 4 and 5 show, translation tr2 provides
lower bounds for ATLir verification only in a limited number
of instances. Also, the bound is rather loose, as the following
example demonstrates.
Example 5. Consider the single-agent CEGS M2 pre-
sented in Figure 4A. The sole available strategy, in which
agent 1 selects always action a, enforces eventually reaching
p, i.e., M2, q0 |= 〈〈1〉〉irFp. On the other hand, M2, q0 6|=
µZ.(K1p ∨ 〈1〉Z). This is because the next-step operator in
ATLir requires reaching p simultaneously from all the states
indistinguishable from q0, whereas p is reached from q0, q1 in
one and two steps, respectively.
3.2 Steadfast Next Step Operator
To obtain a tighter lower bound, and one that works uni-
versally, we introduce a new modality. 〈A〉• can be seen as a
semantic variant of the next-step ability operator 〈A〉 where:
(i) agents in A look for a short-term strategy that succeeds
from the “common knowledge” neighborhood of the initial
state (rather than in the “everybody knows” neighborhood),
and (ii) they are allowed to “steadfastly” pursue their goal
in a variable number of steps within the indistinguishabil-
ity class. In this section, we propose the semantics of 〈A〉•
and show how to revise the lower bound. Some additional
insights are provided in Section 4.
We begin by defining the auxiliary function Reach so that
q ∈ ReachM (sA, Q, ϕ) collects all q ∈ Q such that all the
paths executing sA from q eventually reach ϕ without leav-
ing Q, except possibly for the last step:
ReachM (sA, Q, ϕ) = {q ∈ Q | ∀λ ∈ out(q, sA)
∃i . M, λ[i] |= ϕ and ∀0 ≤ j < i . λ[j] ∈ Q}.
The steadfast next-step operator 〈A〉• is defined as follows:
• M, q |= 〈A〉•ϕ iff there exists sA ∈ ΣirA such that
ReachM (sA, [q]∼C
A
, ϕ) = [q]∼C
A
.
Now we can propose our ultimate attempt at the lower
bound for reachability goals: tr3(〈〈A〉〉irFϕ) = µZ.(EAϕ ∨〈A〉•Z), with the following result.
Proposition 6. If M, q |= µZ.(EAϕ∨〈A〉•Z), then M, q |=
〈〈A〉〉
ir
Fϕ. The converse does not universally hold.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.
As previously, we define a sequence {Fj}j∈N of af -AEµC
formulae s.t. F0 = EAϕ and Fj+1 = F0 ∨〈A〉•Fj , for all j ≥
0. We also use a sequence {Hj}j∈N with Hj = 〈A〉•Fj . From
Kleene fixed-point theorem we have [[µZ.(EAϕ ∨ 〈A〉•Z)]]
=
⋃∞
j=0[[Fj ]] = [[F0]] ∪
⋃∞
j=0[[Hj ]]. Observe that, as ∼AC is
an equivalence relation, we have for each q ∈ St and j ∈ N
that if [q]∼A
C
∩ [[Hj ]] 6= ∅, then [q]∼A
C
⊆ [[Hj ]].
We prove that for each j ∈ N there exists a partial strategy
sjA s.t. dom(s
j
A) = [[Hj ]], ∀q ∈ dom(sjA) ∀λ ∈ out ir(q, sjA) ∃k ∈
N λ[k] |= EAϕ, and sjA ⊆ sj+1A . The proof is by induc-
tion on j. In the base case of H0 = 〈A〉•EAϕ observe
that if q ∈ [[H0]] then there exists a partial strategy s0,qA
with dom(s0,qA ) = [q]∼AC s.t. every λ ∈ out
ir(q, s0,qA ) stays
in [q]∼A
C
until it reaches a state where EAϕ holds. We
can now define s0A =
⋃
[q]∼A
C
∈St/∼A
C
s0,qA which is uniform,
and reaches EAϕ on all execution paths. For the induc-
tive step, we divide the construction of sj+1A in two cases.
Firstly, if q ∈ [[Hj ]], then we put sj+1A (q) = sjA(q). Secondly,
let q ∈ [[Hj+1]] \ [[Hj ]]. In this case there exists a partial
strategy sj+1,qA with dom(s
j+1,q
A ) = [q]∼AC s.t. each outcome
λ ∈ out ir(q, sj+1,qA ) stays in [q]∼AC until it reaches a state
q′ s.t. either q′ |= EAϕ or q′ ∈ [[Hj ]]. In the latter, from
the inductive assumption we know that following sj+1A al-
ways leads to reaching EAϕ without leaving [[Hj ]]. We thus
take sj+1A =
⋃
[q]∼A
C
∈St/∼A
C
sj+1,qA which, again, is uniform,
and reaches EAϕ on all execution paths. This concludes the
inductive part of the proof.
Finally, we build a partial strategy sA =
⋃
j∈N s
j
A, whose
any extension is s.t. for each q ∈ St, if M, q |= µZ.(EAϕ ∨
〈A〉•Z), then a state in which EAϕ holds is eventually reached
along each outcome path λ ∈ out ir(q, s′A). This concludes
the proof of the implication.
To see that the converse does not hold, consider model M3
in Figure 4B. We have that M3, q0 |= 〈〈1〉〉irFp, but M3, q0 6|=
µZ.(K1p ∨ 〈1〉•Z).
Thus, tr3 indeed provides a universal lower bound for
reachability goals expressed in ATLir.
3.3 Lower Bounds for “Always” and “Until”
So far, we have concentrated on reachability goals. We
now extend the main result to all the modalities of ATLir:
Theorem 7.
1. If M, q |= νZ.(CAϕ ∧ 〈A〉•Z), then M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉irGϕ;
2. If M, q |= µZ.(EAϕ ∨ (CAψ ∧ 〈A〉•Z)), then M, q |=
〈〈A〉〉
ir
ψUϕ.
Proof. Case 1: Let us define the sequence {Gj}j∈N of
formulae s.t. G0 = CAϕ and Gj+1 = G0∧〈A〉•Gj , for all j ≥
0. From Kleene fixed-point theorem, [[νZ.(CAϕ ∧ 〈A〉•Z)]] =⋂∞
j=0[[Gj ]]. It suffices to prove that for each j ∈ N there ex-
ists a strategy sjA s.t. ∀q ∈ [[Gj ]] ∀λ ∈ out ir(q, sjA) ∀0 ≤ k ≤ j
λ[k] |= ϕ. The proof is by induction on j, with the trivial
base case. Assume that the inductive assumption holds for
some j ∈ N. From the definition of the steadfast next-step
operator we can define for each equivalence class [q]∼A
C
∈
[[Gj+1]]/ ∼AC a partial strategy sq,j+1A s.t. ∀q′ ∈ [q]∼AC ∀λ ∈
out ir(q, sq,j+1A ) λ[1] ∈ [[Gj ]]. We now construct
sj+1A =
⋃
[q]∼A
C
∈[[Gj+1]]/∼AC
sq,j+1A ∪ sjA|[[CAϕ]]\[[Gj ]].
Intuitively, sjA enforces that a path leaving each q ∈ [[Gj+1]]
stays within [[CAϕ]] for at least j steps. Moreover, s
j
A ⊆ sj+1A
for all j. Thus, sA =
⋃
j∈N s
j
A enforces that a path leaving
each q ∈ ⋃j∈N[[Gj ]] stays within [[CAϕ]] for infinitely many
steps, which concludes the proof. Note that the correctness
of the construction relies the fact that ∼AC is an equivalence
relation.
Case 2: analogous to Proposition 6.
4. DISCUSSION & PROPERTIES
Theorem 7 shows that tr3(ϕ) provides a correct lower
bound of the value of ϕ for all formulae of ATLir. In this
section, we discuss the tightness of the approximation from
the theoretical point of view. An empirical evaluation will
be presented in Section 6.
4.1 Comparing tr2 and tr3 for Reachability Goals
Translation tr3 updates tr2 by replacing the standard next-
step ability operator 〈A〉 with the “steadfast next-step abil-
ity”〈A〉•. The difference between 〈A〉ϕ and 〈A〉•ϕ is twofold.
First, 〈A〉ϕ looks for a winning strategy in the “everybody
knows” neighborhood of a given state (i.e., [q]∼E
A
), whereas
〈A〉•ϕ looks at the “common knowledge” neighborhood (i.e.,
[q]∼C
A
). Secondly, 〈A〉• allows to “zig-zag” across [q]∼C
A
until
a state satisfying ϕ is found.
Actually, the first change would suffice to provide a uni-
versally correct lower bound for ATLir. The second update
makes it more useful in models where agents may not see
the occurrence of some action, such as M2 of Figure 4A. To
see this formally, we show that tr3 provides a strictly tighter
approximation than tr2 on singleton coalitions:
Proposition 8. For A = {a}, if M, q |= µZ.(Kaϕ ∨
〈a〉Z), then M, q |= µZ.(Kaϕ ∨ 〈a〉•Z). The converse does
not universally hold.
Proof. It suffices to observe that M, q |= 〈a〉ϕ implies
M, q |= 〈a〉•ϕ, for any ϕ ∈ af -AEµC. Note that this is true
only for single-agent coalitions. For the converse, notice that
in CEGS M2 from Figure 4A we have M2, q0 |= µZ.(K1p ∨
〈1〉•Z) and M2, q0 6|= µZ.(K1p ∨ 〈1〉Z).
On the other hand, if agent a always sees whenever an
action occurs, then tr2 and tr3 coincide for a’s abilities. For-
mally, let us call CEGS M lockstep for a if, whenever there
is a transition from q to q′ in M , we have q 6∼a q′. The
following is straightforward.
Proposition 9. If M is lockstep for a, then M, q |= 〈a〉ϕ
iff M, q |= 〈a〉•ϕ. In consequence, M, q |= tr2(〈〈a〉〉Fϕ) iff
M, q |= tr3(〈〈a〉〉Fϕ).
4.2 When is the Lower Bound Tight?
An interesting question is: what is the subclass of CEGS’s
for which tr3 is tight, i.e., the answer given by the approx-
imation is exact? We address the question only partially
here. In fact, we characterize a subclass of CEGS’s for which
tr3 is certainly not tight, by the necessary condition below.
Let γ ≡ Gψ or γ ≡ ψ1 Uψ2 for some ψ,ψ1, ψ2 ∈ ATLir.
We say that strategy sA ∈ ΣirA is winning for γ from q if it
obtains γ for all paths in outir(q, sA). Moreover, for such sA,
let RR(q, sA, γ) be the relevant reachable states of sA in the
context of γ, defined as follows: RR(q, sA,Gψ) is the set of
states that occur anywhere in outir(q, sA);RR(q, sA, ψ1 Uψ2)
is the set of states that occur anywhere in outir(q, sA) before
the first occurrence of ψ2.
Proposition 10. Let M be a CEGS, q ∈ StM , and ϕ ≡
〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ. Furthermore, suppose that ϕ and tr3(ϕ) are either
both true or both false in M, q. Then:
1. either no strategy sA ∈ ΣirA is winning for γ from q, or
2. there is a strategy sA ∈ ΣirA which is winning for γ
from every q′ ∈ RR(q, sA, γ).
Conversely, the approximation is not tight if there are
winning strategies, but each of them reaches a intermedi-
ate state q′ from which no winning substrategy can be com-
puted. This can only happen if some states in [q′]∼E
A
are not
reachable by sA. In consequence, the agents in A forget rel-
evant information that comes alone from the fact that they
are executing sA. We will use Proposition 10 in Section 6 to
show that the few benchmarks existing in the literature are
not amenable to our approximations.
5. APPROXIMATION SEMANTICS FORATLir
Note thatM, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ always impliesM, q |= EA〈〈A〉〉Irγ.
Based on this, and the lower bounds established in Theo-
rem 7, we propose the lower approximation tr and the upper
approximation TR for ATLir as follows:
tr(p) = p, tr(¬ϕ) = ¬TR(ϕ), tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ),
tr(〈A〉ϕ) = 〈A〉tr(ϕ),
tr(〈〈A〉〉
ir
Gϕ) = νZ.(CAtr(ϕ) ∧ 〈A〉•Z),
tr(〈〈A〉〉
ir
ψUϕ) = µZ.
(
EAtr(ϕ) ∨ (CAtr(ψ) ∧ 〈A〉•Z)
)
.
TR(p) = p, TR(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ),
TR(ϕ ∧ ψ) = TR(ϕ) ∧ TR(ψ),
TR(〈A〉ϕ) = EA〈〈A〉〉IrXTR(ϕ),
TR(〈〈A〉〉
ir
Gϕ) = EA〈〈A〉〉IrGTR(ϕ),
TR(〈〈A〉〉
ir
ψUϕ) = EA〈〈A〉〉IrTR(ψ) U TR(ϕ).
The following important results can be proved by straight-
forward induction on the structure of ϕ.
Theorem 11. For any ATLir formula ϕ:
M, q |= tr(ϕ) ⇒ M, q |= ϕ ⇒ M, q |= TR(ϕ).
Theorem 12. If ϕ includes only coalitions of size at most
1, then model checking tr(ϕ) and TR(ϕ) can be done in time
O(|M | · |ϕ|). In the general case, the problem is between NP
and ∆P2 wrt maxA∈ϕ(|∼CA |) and |ϕ|.
Thus, our approximations potentially offer computational
advantage when we consider coalitions whose members have
similar knowledge, and especially when verifying abilities of
individual agents.
Approximation of abilities under perfect recall. In
this paper, we focus on approximating abilities based on
memoryless strategies. Approximations might be equally
useful for ATLiR (i.e., the variant of ATL using uniform
perfect recall strategies); we simply begin with the problem
that is easier in its exact form. The high intractability of
ATLiR model checking suggests that a substantial extension
will be needed to come up with satisfactory approximations.
We also observe that the benchmark in Section 6.2 is a
model of perfect recall, i.e., the states explicitly encode the
agents’ memory of their past observations. In consequence,
the memoryless and perfect recall semantics of ATL coin-
cide. The experimental results suggest that, for such models,
verification of perfect recall abilities can be much improved
by using the approximations proposed here.
k #states tgen
Lower approx. Upper approx.
Match
Exact
tverif result tverif result tg+tv
1 15 0.001 0.0001 True 0.00007 True 100% 0.006
2 225 0.02 0.002 True 0.001 True 100% 14.79
3 3375 0.50 0.14 True 0.03 True 100% timeout
4 50625 14.39 22.78 True 0.77 True 100% timeout
Figure 5: Experimental results for simple voting model (ϕ1)
k #states tgen
Lower approx. Upper approx.
Match
Exact
tverif result tverif result tg+tv
1 15 0.001 0.00005 False 0.00003 False 100% 0.005
2 225 0.02 0.0005 False 0.0003 False 100% 0.02
3 3375 0.50 0.01 False 0.007 False 100% 0.04
4 50625 14.39 0.94 False 0.12 False 100% 0.12
Figure 6: Experimental results for simple voting model (ϕ2)
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Theorem 11 and Proposition 12 validate the approxima-
tion semantics theoretically. In this section, we back up the
theoretical results by looking at how well the approximations
work in practice. We address two issues: the performance
and the accuracy of the approximations.
6.1 Existing Benchmarks
The only publicly available tool that provides verification
of ATL with imperfect information is MCMAS [25, 28, 23,
24]. We note, however, that imperfect information strategies
are not really at the heart of the model-checker, the focus
being on verification of CTLK and ATLK with perfect in-
formation strategies. More dedicated attempts produced so
far only experimental algorithms, with preliminary perfor-
mance results reported in [26, 8, 17, 9, 27]. Because of that,
there are few benchmarks for model checking ATLir, and
few experiments have actually been conducted.
The classes of models typically used to estimate the per-
formance of ATLir model checking are TianJi [28, 8] and
Castles [26]. The properties to be verified are usually reach-
ability properties, saying that Tian Ji can achieve a win over
the king (in TianJi), or that a given coalition of workers can
defeat another castle (for Castles). We observe that both
TianJi and Castles do not satisfy the necessary condition
in Proposition 10. This is because the states of the model do
not encode some relevant information about the actions that
have been already played by the coalition. Thus, even one
step before winning the game, the players take into account
also some (possibly losing) states that couldn’t be reached
by the strategy that they are executing.
This means that the AEµC approximations, proposed in
this paper, are not useful for TianJi and Castles. It also
means that the benchmarks arguably do not capture realistic
scenarios. We usually do not want to assume agents to forget
their own actions from a few steps back. In the remainder,
we propose several new benchmarks that can be used to
evaluate our approximation scheme.
Finally, we note that most experiments reported in the
literature use very simple input formulae (no nested strate-
gic modalities; singleton coalitions or groups of agents with
identical indistinguishability relations). As the results show,
verification of such formulae is complex enough – see the per-
formance of exact model checking in the rest of this section.
6.2 Verifying the Simple Voting Scenario
For the first benchmark, we adapt the simple voting sce-
nario from Example 1. The model consists of k + 1 agents
(k voters v1, . . . , vk, and 1 coercer c). The module of voter
vi implements the transition structure from Figure 1, with
three modifications. First, the voter can at any state execute
the “idle” action wait (this is needed to ensure uniformity
of the resulting CEGS). In consequence, synchronous vot-
ing as well as interleaving of votes is allowed. Secondly, in
states q3, . . . , q6, the coercer’s action np (“no punishment”)
leads to an additional final state (q′7, . . . , q
′
10), labeled ac-
cordingly. Thirdly, the old and new leaves in the structure
(i.e., q7, . . . , q10, q
′
7, . . . , q
′
10) are labeled with an additional
atomic proposition finishi.
As specifications, we want to use the properties saying
that: (i) the coercer can force the voter to vote for candidate
1 or else the voter is punished, and (ii) the voter can avoid
voting for candidate 1 and being punished (cf. Example 2).
Note, however, that the model used for the experiments is
an unconstrained product of the voter modules. Thus, it
includes also paths that were absent in the CEGSMvote from
Example 1 (in particular, ones where a voter executes wait
all the time). To deal with this, we modify the specifications
from Example 2 so that they discard such paths:
1. ϕ1 ≡ 〈〈c〉〉irG
(
(finishi ∧ ¬puni)→ votei,1
)
which always
holds in the voting scenario,
2. ϕ2 ≡ 〈〈vi〉〉irF
(
finishi∧¬puni∧¬votei,1
)
which is always
false.
The results of experiments for ϕ1 are shown in Figure 5,
and for ϕ2 in Figure 6. The columns present the following
information: parameter of the model (the number of vot-
ers k), size of the state space (#states), generation time for
models (tgen), time and output of verification (tver, result)
for model checking the lower approximation tr(ϕ), and sim-
ilarly for the upper approximation TR(ϕ); the percentage
of cases where the bounds have matched (match), and the
total running time of the exact ATLir model checking for ϕ
(tg+tv). The running times are given in seconds. Timeout
indicates that the process did not terminate in 48 hours (!).
The computation of the lower and upper approximations
was done with a straightforward implementation (in Python
3) of the fixpoint model checking algorithm for AEµC and
ATLIr, respectively. We used the explicit representation of
models, and the algorithms were not optimized in any way.
The exact ATLir model checking was done with MCMAS
1.2.2 in such a way that the underlying CEGS of the ISPL
code was isomorphic to the explicit models used to com-
pute approximations. The subjective semantics of ATLir
was obtained by using the option -atlk 2 and setting the
initial states as the starting indistinguishability class for the
proponent. All the tests were conducted on a PC with an
Intel Core i5-2500 CPU with dynamic clock speed of 3.30
GHz up to 3,60 GHz, 8 GB of RAM (two modules DDR3,
1600 MHz bus clock), and Windows 10 (64bit).
Discussion of results. Exact model checking with MC-
MAS performed well on the inputs where no winning strat-
egy existed (formula ϕ2), but was very bad at finding the ex-
isting winning strategy for formula ϕ1. In that case, our ap-
proximations offered huge speedup. Moreover, the approxi-
mations actually found the winning strategy in all the tested
instances, thus producing fully conclusive output. This might
be partly due to the fact that the scenario uses perfect re-
call models, i.e., ones encoding perfect memory of players
explicitly in their local states.
Figure 7: Example 6-endplay in bridge:
6.3 Bridge Endplay
We use bridge play scenarios of a type often considered in
bridge handbooks and magazines. The task is to find a win-
ning strategy for the declarer, usually depicted at the South
position (S), in the k-endplay of the game, see Figure 7 for
an example. The deck consists of 4n cards in total (n in
each suit),2 and the initial state captures each player hold-
ing k cards in their hand, after having played n − k cards.
This way we obtain a family of models, parameterized by
the possible values of (n, k). A NoTrump contract is being
played; the declarer wins if she takes more than k/2 tricks
in the endplay.
The players’ cards are played sequentially (clockwise). S
plays first at the beginning of the game. Each next trick (i.e.,
the set of four played cards, one per player) is opened by the
player who won the latest trick. The declarer handles her
own cards and the ones of the dummy (N). The opponents
(W and E) handle their own hands each. The cards of the
dummy are visible to everybody; the other hands are only
seen by their owners. Each player remembers the cards that
have already been played, including the ones that were used
up before the initial state of the k-endplay. That is, the local
state of a player contains: the current hand of the player,
the current hand of the dummy, the cards from the deck
that were already used up in the previous tricks, the status
of the current trick, i.e., the sequence of pairs (player,card)
for the cards already played within the trick (alternatively,
the sequence of cards already played within the trick, plus
who started the trick); and the current score (which team
has won how many tricks so far).
We observe the following properties of the model. First,
it is turn-based (with the “idle” action wait that players
use when another player is laying down a card). Secondly,
players have imperfect information, since they cannot infer
(except for the last round) the hands of the other players.
The missing information is relevant: anybody who has ever
played bridge or poker knows how much the limited knowl-
edge of the opponents’ hands decreases one’s chances of win-
ning the game. Thirdly, this is a model of imperfect recall.
The players do not remember in which order the cards have
been played so far, and who had what cards;3 formally: the
model is a DAG and not a tree as there are histories h 6≈a h′
such that last(h) ∼a last(h′)). Finally, the model is lock-
step (everybody sees when a transition happens), and thus
tr2 and tr3 coincide on singleton coalitions.
(n, k) #states tgen
Lower approx. Upper approx.
Match
Exact
tverif %true tverif %true tg+tv
(1, 1) 11 0.0005 0.0001 100% 7e-05 100% 100% 0.14
(2, 2) 310 0.017 0.002 60% 0.001 60% 100% 2.42 h?
(3, 3) 12626 0.92 0.16 70% 0.05 70% 100% timeout
(4, 4) 534722 41.66 172.07 60% 2.61 60% 100% timeout
(5, 5)? 2443467 2641.86 76 h 100% 1929 100% 100% timeout
Figure 8: Experimental results: solving endplay in bridge
The results of the experiments for formula ϕ ≡ 〈〈S〉〉
ir
Fwin
are shown in Figure 8. The columns present the following
information: parameters of the model (n, k), size of the state
space (#states), generation time for models (tgen), time
and output of verification (tver, %true) for model checking
the lower approximation tr(ϕ), and similarly for the upper
approximation TR(ϕ); the percentage of cases where the
bounds have matched (match), and the total running time
2 In real bridge, n = 13.
3 This reflects the capabilities of middle-level bridge players:
they usually remember what has been played, but not in
which order and by whom. Advanced players remember also
who played what, and masters remember the whole history
of the play.
of the exact ATLir model checking for ϕ (tg+tv). The times
are given in seconds, except where indicated.
The experiments were run in the same environment as for
the voting scenario in Section 6.2. Again, we ran the exper-
iments for up to 48h per instance. The results in each row
are averaged over 20 randomly generated instances, except
for (?) where only 1 instance was used.
Discussion of results. In the experiments, our approxima-
tions offered a dramatic speedup. Exact model checking of
ϕ was infeasible except for the simplest models (hundreds of
states), even with an optimized symbolic model checker like
MCMAS. In contrast, the bounds were verified for models
up to millions of states. Moreover, our approximations ob-
tained an astonishing level of accuracy: the bounds matched
in 100% of the analyzed instances, thus producing fully con-
clusive output. This was partly because we only considered
endplays in relatively small decks. The gap grows for decks
of more than 20 cards (we verified that by hand on selected
instances from bridge literature).
(n, k) #states tgen
Lower approx. Upper approx.
Match
Exact
tverif %true tverif %true tg+tv
(1, 1) 19 0.001 0.0003 100% 0.0003 100% 100% 14.93 h?
(2, 2) 774 0.07 0.01 40% 0.02 50.00% 90% timeout
(3, 3) 51865 6.71 29.31 65% 2.45 85% 80% timeout
Figure 9: Experimental results for absent-minded declarer
(n, k) #states tgen
Lower approx. Upper approx.
Match
Exact
tverif %true tverif %true tg+tv
(1, 1) 19 0.002 0.0001 0% 0.0003 100% 0% 14.93 h?
(2, 2) 756 0.08 0.003 0% 0.03 95% 5% timeout
(3, 3) 55688 9.99 0.09 0% 2.35 70% 30% timeout
Figure 10: Absent-minded declarer, approximation tr2
6.4 Bridge Endplay by Absentminded Declarer
In the bridge endplay models, the players always see when
a move is made. Thus, for singleton coalitions, the steadfast
next-time operator 〈a〉• coincides with the standard next-
time abilities expressed by 〈a〉. In order to better assess the
performance, we have considered a variant of the scenario
where the declarer is absentminded and does not see the
cards being laid on the table until the end of each trick.
Moreover, she can play her and the dummy’s cards at any
moment, even in parallel with the opponents. This results in
larger indistinguishability classes for S, but also in a general
increase of the number of states and transitions.
The results of the experiments are shown in Figure 9. Note
that, for this class of models, the bounds do not match as
tightly as before. Still, the approximation was conclusive in
an overwhelming majority of instances. Moreover, it grossly
outperformed the exact model checking which was (barely)
possible only in the trivial case of n = 1.
The models are not turn-based, not lockstep, and not
of perfect recall. Since they are not lockstep, approxima-
tions tr2 and tr3 do not have to coincide. In Figure 10, we
present the experimental results obtained with tr2, which
show that the improved approximation tr3 provides tighter
lower bounds also from the practical point of view.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Verification of strategic properties in scenarios with im-
perfect information is difficult, both theoretically and in
practice. In this paper, we suggest that model checking of
logics like ATLir can be in some cases obtained by comput-
ing an under- and an overapproximation of the ATLir spec-
ification, and comparing if the bounds match. In a way, our
proposal is similar to the idea of may/must abstraction [14,
4, 22], only in our case the approximations are obtained by
transforming formulae rather than models.
We propose such approximations, prove their correctness,
and show that, for singleton coalitions, their values can be
computed in polynomial time. We also propose novel bench-
marks for experimental validation. Finally, we report very
promising experimental results, in both performance and ac-
curacy of the output. To our best knowledge, this is the first
successful attempt at approximating strategic abilities under
imperfect information by means of fixpoint methods.
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